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Article

Boeing, the IAM, and the NLRB: Why U.S.
Labor Law Is Failing
Julius G. Getman

†

INTRODUCTION
In April 2011, the National Labor Relations Board’s
(NLRB’s) Acting General Counsel, Lafe Solomon, issued a com1
plaint against The Boeing Company (Boeing). The complaint
alleged that Boeing violated the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) by shifting assembly work on its 787 Dreamliner from
2
Everett, Washington, to North Charleston, South Carolina.
According to the complaint, the company decided to shift work
from Everett to North Charleston to retaliate against workers
3
in Everett for past strikes—activity protected by the NLRA.
The NLRB has been under constant attack ever since.
Many of the Board’s critics have claimed to discern a conspiracy
4
with “big labor” to further the political fortunes of President
Obama. Others accused the agency of having an anti-business,
5
job-endangering agenda. Joe Nocera, writing in the New York
Times, stated, “Seriously, when has a government agency ever
tried to dictate where a company makes its products? I can’t
ever remember it happening. . . . I’ve become mildly obsessed

† Julius G. Getman, Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair, The University of
Texas at Austin School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge significant
assistance in editing and research from former NLRB attorney Sonya Spielberg. Copyright © 2014 by Julius G. Getman.
1. Complaint and Notice of Hearing at 1, 10, Boeing Co., No. 19–CA–
23431 (Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. June 20, 2011) [hereinafter Complaint].
2. Id. at 1, 5.
3. Id. at 6.
4. See, e.g., Editorial, NLRB Favors Unionized States, ARIZ. REPUBLIC,
Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/opinions/articles/
2011/12/13/20111213editorial1214-nlrb-favors-unionized-states.html.
5. Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., How Democrats Hurt Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2011, at A25.
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with the Boeing affair. Nothing matters more right now than
6
job creation.”
In this article, I will show that the National Labor Relations Board (Board) has done nothing to warrant the torrent of
criticism. The General Counsel’s action was consistent with the
language of the NLRA and supported by precedent. It posed no
serious threat to Boeing’s well-being, or even to its decision to
assemble 787 Dreamliners in South Carolina. Properly understood, the clamor over Boeing’s right to make corporate business decisions demonstrates the weakness of the NLRB and not
its rampant power. Indeed, the entire campaign against the
Board appears to be part of a political effort aimed at organized
labor and the last remnants of the New Deal legislation that
created the NLRB. What is now needed is an effort to recreate
the NLRB into the agency it was intended to be.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND LEADING TO THE
BOARD’S COMPLAINT
In the fall of 2009, Boeing faced a serious problem. Its new,
lightweight, fuel-efficient 787 Dreamliner had elicited orders
from all over the world, but Boeing did not have enough planes
7
to meet promised time schedules. Much of the problem was
caused by Boeing’s decision to outsource the manufacture of
components to partner companies around the world and to
adopt a “just-in-time” inventory system requiring that compo8
nents be delivered according to a precise schedule. Several of
the suppliers and partners that were supposed to produce the
components were years behind schedule, contributing to Boe9
ing’s backlog of nearly 900 orders. When Boeing finally received the necessary parts, it was understandably under pres10
sure to speed up assembly.
6. Id.
7. Peter Cohan, For Boeing, It’s Finally Time to Test-Fly the 787 Dreamliner, DAILY-FINANCE (Dec. 13, 2009, 11:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/
2009/12/13/will-boeing-finally-test-fly-the-787-dreamliner.
8. For a discussion of Boeing’s manufacturing model, see Debby Arkell,
The Evolution of Creation, BOEING FRONTIERS (Mar. 2005), http://www.boeing
.com/news/frontiers/archive/2005/march/mainfeature1.html. Boeing later admitted that outsourcing too much of the work to suppliers was a serious mistake. Jad Mouawad & Christopher Drew, New Problems with Boeing’s 787 Revive Concerns About Its Reliability, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, at B1, B4.
9. See Cohan, supra note 7.
10. See David Kesmodel, Boeing’s Dreamliner Makes Its Way to Japan:
Executives Say They Plan to Nearly Double Jet’s Production Within Six
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Boeing’s initial plans for the Dreamliner called for assembly by its skilled unionized employees in Everett, Washington,
11
part of Boeing’s Puget Sound complex. Before committing to
assembly in Everett, Boeing had obtained financial incentives
12
of over $3 billion from the Washington State Legislature. A
production line capable of producing about seven Dreamliners
13
per month was established in 2007. The Puget Sound unit,
comprised of approximately 18,000 employees, had historically
14
performed the final assembly of all Boeing planes.
The assembly line workers in Puget Sound were represented by Local Lodge 751 of the International Association of Ma15
chinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). Relations between
Boeing and the union were complex and often confrontational.
Three of the previous five contract negotiations (in 1995, 2005,
16
and 2008) had resulted in strikes. The two-month strike in
17
2008 was particularly bitter. Boeing’s stock tumbled in its afMonths, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052970204422404576595193592207856.
11. In late 2003, Boeing announced that it would place the assembly line
for the Dreamliner in Everett, Washington, after the Washington State Legislature passed a tax and subsidy incentive package totaling more than $3.2 billion. See James Wallace, Boeing, State Make It Official—7E7 is Everett’s,
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.seattlepi.com/
business/article/Boeing-state-make-it-official-7E7-is-Everett-s-1132611.php.
12. Id.
13. See Dominic Gates, Boeing’s Dreamliner Is Fastest-Selling New Jet,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 4, 2007, http://seattletimes.com/html/boeingaerospace/
2003650223_boeing04.html.
14. Advice Memorandum from Barry J. Kearney, Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Div. of Advice, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to Richard L. Ahearn, Reg’l Dir., Region 16, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., at 3 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter NLRB Advice Memo], available at http://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/fact-sheets/fact
-sheet-archives/boeing-complaint-fact-sheet/boeing-documents (follow “Advice
Memo” hyperlink).
15. See IAM-Boeing Contract, IAM DISTRICT 751, http://www.iam751
.org/pages/boeingcontract.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
16. See Darrin Hoop, IAM Strike Back on at Boeing, SOCIALISTWORKER.ORG (Sept. 5, 2008), http://socialistworker.org/2008/09/05/strike-back
-on-at -boeing.
17. On October 6, 2008, Boeing’s CEO Jim McNerney sent a long e-mail to
Boeing employees about the strike. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 3
(“McNerney stated that . . . ‘[t]he issue of competitiveness as it relates to this
strike is a big deal[.]’ He also tied labor disputes to problems with Boeing’s
customer relationships. After asserting that the union had recommended that
its members reject contract offers and go on strike four of the last five negotiations going back to 1995, he wrote, ‘We believe this track record of repeated
union work stoppages is earning us a reputation as an unreliable supplier to
our customers—who ultimately provide job security by buying our airplanes.’”).
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18

termath. During the summer of 2009, Boeing publically announced that it was considering opening a second production
line for the Dreamliner line at its new facility in North
Charleston rather than Everett because of its concern over
19
strikes. However, Boeing spokesmen indicated to Washington
state officials that it would prefer to use Everett because of the
skill and experience of its workforce, as long as it could be as20
sured that the union would not strike.
Boeing had acquired its North Charleston facility from
Vought Aircraft, with which Boeing had previously contracted
21
to manufacture the rear sections of the Dreamliner fuselage.
The decision to purchase Vought came after Boeing had identified Vought as a “problem partner” because it had failed to de22
liver on schedule. According to Bloomberg News, “incomplete
work at the facility had contributed to two years of delays for
23
the new plane.” Early in July 2009, Boeing announced that it
planned to purchase Vought for the avowed purpose of speeding
24
up production of parts for the 787. At the time of the pur25
chase, Vought employees were represented by the IAM.
Boeing announced that it had completed its purchase of
26
Vought on July 30, 2009. That same day, a Vought employee
filed a petition with the NLRB, asking the Board to decertify
27
the incumbent machinists’ union. A short time later, the
NLRB scheduled a vote on whether the workers wished to re28
tain the IAM as their bargaining representative. Boeing actively opposed the union in the campaign that preceded the de29
certification vote. According to the NLRB Advice Memo:
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4 (“[On October 17], Boeing’s Vice President for Government and
Community Relations Fred Kiga spoke at an aerospace conference. . . . He reportedly also told the conference that ‘labor unrest’ could drive Boeing’s decision on where to build planes in the future.”).
20. See Boeing Balks at Strikes, SPOKESMAN REV. (July 9, 2009), http://
www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/jul/09/boeing-balks-at-strikes.
21. Susanna Ray, Boeing Agrees To Buy Vought Aircraft 787 Operations
(Update4), BLOOMBERG (July 7, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=newsarchive&sid=aVShtocbHO4E.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 4–5.
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 6.
29. Id. at 5–6.
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During August, Boeing denied the Union access to the employees in
the North Charleston plant and wrote a memorandum to the employees stating that it preferred to “deal with employees directly without
intermediaries.” Boeing also issued a FAQ document to the employees
stating that the mass layoffs that took place at the Vought plant in
late 2008 were due to the “unique situation created by the Everett
strike.” Meanwhile, the South Carolina press was reporting that a decertification decision could influence where Boeing located the second
30
787 assembly line.

The employees voted decisively 199 to 68 in favor of decer31
tification. Boeing now had a facility in which it could complete
assembly of the Dreamliner without concern about strikes; although the earlier production problems at Vought made clear
that a great deal of training would be necessary for its workers
32
to play a key role in assembly of the 787.
Given the great backlog of 787 orders, it would have made
sense for Boeing to establish new lines in both Everett and
33
North Charleston. However, instead of proceeding on both
paths simultaneously, Boeing announced that it would estab34
lish a second line either in Everett or in South Carolina. It
thereby publicly placed Washington State and South Carolina
in competition for assembly work on the 787. Boeing was able
to use the competition to obtain additional tax breaks and rev35
enue from South Carolina. In so doing, Boeing also ’explicitly
pressured the IAM for a no-strike promise with regard to as36
sembly of the 787 and implicitly expressed its displeasure
with the union’s past strikes.
In October 2009, after several rounds of negotiations involving the union and officials of both Washington State and
30. Id.
31. Dominic Gates, Boeing Charleston Decertifies Machinists Union,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, http://seattletimes.com/html/boeingaerospace/
2009843246_boeing11.html.
32. See id.
33. Had it done so there would have been no basis for legal complaint by
the union. The workers in Everett had no legal claim to be the only facility assembling Dreamliners. See Boeing v. NLRB, A.B.A. LAB. & EMP. L. FLASH
(Oct. 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/
ll_flash/1110_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html
[hereinafter
A.B.A. FLASH].
34. Dominic Gates, Boeing, Union Deadlocked in Secret Talks over New
787 Line, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, http://seattletimes.com/html/
boeingaerospace/2010113362_boeing22.html.
35. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 9.
36. Don McIntosh, Boeing Uses Jobs to Pressure Government, Union for
Concessions, NW. LAB. PRESS (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.nwlaborpress.org/
2009/1016/10-16-09IAM.html.
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South Carolina, Boeing announced that it would open its se37
cond line in South Carolina. Boeing officials stressed in a series of statements that the decision was based on its desire to
avoid strikes such as those which had previously occurred at its
38
unionized facilities.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES
In March 2010, Local Lodge 751 filed unfair labor practice
39
charges against Boeing on behalf of the workers at Everett.
The union charged violations of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of
40
the NLRA. Section 8(a)(3) prohibits penalizing employees be41
cause they exercise their section 7 rights, which includes the
42
right to strike. Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice to threaten employees for exercising their rights under the
43
Act. The union claimed that by choosing to assemble planes in
North Charleston rather than Everett, Boeing was punishing
44
its workers in Everett because of their past strikes. It also alleged that statements Boeing officials made concerning its decision were unlawful threats of retaliation based on union activi45
ty.
Under the NLRA, the NLRB’s General Counsel, acting on
the basis of investigation by his or her staff, makes the initial
46
decision as to the legal validity of a charge. If the charge is
deemed to be factually and legally sufficient, a complaint is issued in the name of the General Counsel, which sets the stage
for a hearing before an administrative law judge and review by
47
the NLRB members.

37. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 10.
38. Id. at 10–12.
39. Union Files NLRB Charges to Stop Illegal Intimidation, 751 AERO
MECHANIC (Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 751, Seattle,
Wash.), Apr. 2010, at 2 [hereinafter Union Files Charges], available at http://
www.iam751.org/aero/April_2010_Aero.pdf.
40. See A.B.A. FLASH, supra note 33.
41. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012).
42. See id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
43. Id. § 158(a)(1).
44. Union Files Charges, supra note 39, at 2. The union claimed that various statements by Boeing before and after choosing Charleston were intended
to let its workers in Everett know that they would pay a price for exercising
their rights under the NLRA. See id.
45. Id.
46. National Labor Relations Act § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2012).
47. Id.
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Acting General Counsel Solomon considered the charge
48
against Boeing for over a year. He repeatedly urged the par49
ties to settle the dispute through negotiation. Although he did
not make a formal settlement recommendation, Solomon made
clear that a sensible settlement would be in everyone’s interest
and could be achieved best by the establishment of two new as50
sembly lines, one in Everett and one in North Charleston.
51
Boeing officials did not offer to settle the case on this basis.
During the course of his investigation, as is typical in politically sensitive and legally complex cases, Solomon submitted
the issue for study to the agency’s Advice Branch, which responded with a memorandum that included a detailed statement of facts and a careful analysis of the law. The April 11,
2011 “Advice Memo” concluded that Boeing had violated the
law based on the “Employer’s coercive and threatening statements and . . . the Employer’s decision to locate the second line
at a nonunion facility and to establish a dual-sourcing supply
52
program in retaliation for protected activity.” The memo cited
several Board cases holding that actions in effect punishing
former strikers could not be justified on the basis of concern
53
over future or past protected activity.
On April 20, 2011, with no settlement in sight, General
Counsel Solomon issued a complaint based on the legal analy54
sis contained in the memo. In accordance with the law and
long-standing NLRB practice, Solomon acted independently of
the five members of the NLRB, who act as the agency’s adjudi55
catory arm. Several statements from Boeing officials were cit48. See A.B.A. FLASH, supra note 33.
49. See Aubrey Cohen, Judge Urges Settlement of NLRB Complaint
Against Boeing, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, June 14, 2011, http://www
.seattlepi.com/business/article/Judge-urges-settlement-of-NLRB-complaint
-against-1423811.php.
50. Telephone Conversation with Lafe Solomon, General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board (Fall 2012).
51. Melanie Trottman, Boeing Rejects Union on Plant, WALL ST. J., June
10, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023042593045
76375940769488316.
52. NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 1.
53. Id. at 14–16, 18–19.
54. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5 (“In or about October 2009 . . . Respondent decided to transfer its second 787 Dreamliner production line of 3 planes
per month from the Unit to its non-union site in North Charleston, South Carolina.”).
55. E-mail from Nancy Cleeland, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to Tom Bettag, Exec. Producer, State of the Union (Apr. 27, 2011,
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56

ed in the complaint. To remedy the alleged violation, the complaint called for an order “requiring Respondent [Boeing] to . . .
operate its second line of 787 Dreamliner aircraft assembly
production in the State of Washington, utilizing supply
lines . . . in the Seattle, Washington, and Portland, Oregon, ar57
ea facilities.”
Contrary to many subsequent accusations, the complaint
did not order or suggest shutting down the South Carolina fa58
cility. In fact, it specifically stated that “the Acting General
Counsel does not seek to prohibit Respondent from making
non-discriminatory decisions with respect to where work will be
performed, including non-discriminatory decisions with respect
59
to work at its North Charleston, South Carolina, facility.”
A complaint by the General Counsel is the first step in a
60
complex, often protracted legal process. It is followed by an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ),
61
who makes suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law.
3:52 PM), http://causeofaction.org/assets/uploads/2012/04/NLRB-FOIA
-U00002880.pdf [hereinafter Cleeland Correction Email].
56. Complaint, supra note 1, at 5 (“[In] its October 28, 2009, memorandum entitled ‘787 Second Line, Questions and Answers for Managers,’ [Boeing] informed employees, among other things, that its decision to locate the
second 787 Dreamliner line in South Carolina was made in order to reduce
Respondent’s vulnerability to delivery disruptions caused by work stoppages. . . . [On] December 7, 2009, [Boeing Vice President Ray] Conner and
[Spokesman Jim] Proulx in an article appearing in the Seattle Times, attributed Respondent’s 787 Dreamliner production decision to use a ‘dualsourcing’ system and to contract with separate suppliers for the South Carolina line to past Unit strikes. . . . [On] December 8, 2009, Conner in an article
appearing in the Puget Sound Business Journal, attributed Respondent’s 787
Dreamliner production decision to use a ‘dual-sourcing’ system and to contract
with separate suppliers for the South Carolina line to past Unit strikes. . . .
[On] March 2, 2010, [Boeing’s CEO of Commercial Airplanes Jim] Albaugh, in
a video-taped interview with a Seattle Times reporter, stated that Respondent
decided to locate its 787 Dreamliner second line in South Carolina because of
past unit strikes.”). Boeing sent a memo to its managers explaining its decision: “‘In the final analysis, this came down to . . . diversifying the company to
protect against the risk of production disruption . . . .’” NLRB Advice Memo,
supra note 14, at 10 (quoting a Boeing memo from Oct. 28, 2009).
57. Complaint, supra note 1, at 7–8.
58. Cleeland Correction Email, supra note 55.
59. Id. at 8.
60. See LEE MODJESKA & ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, 1 FEDERAL LABOR
LAW: NLRB PRACTICE 38 (2013).
61. Id. at 56–58. The evidentiary hearing was held on June 14, 2011 and
lasted for several days. See Get the Facts on NLRB v. Boeing, IAM DISTRICT
751, http://www.iam.org/nlrb (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). The ALJ never issued
a decision, however, because the parties reached a settlement before he could
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The ALJ report is subject to review by a panel of Board mem62
bers. If the Board panel decides that an unfair labor practice
has been committed, it issues an order requiring the charged
63
party to take steps to remedy its illegal actions. But the
Board’s order is not legally binding on a party until it is “en64
forced” on review by a Court of Appeals. The entire process, if
played out to the end, is likely to consume several years. The
65
complaint may be rejected at any step in the process. The
Dickensian delays inherent in the process are often alleviated
66
by settlement, since the parties in most cases prefer compromise to uncertainty. There is little doubt that the parties could
have easily reached a settlement in this case by agreeing to
create new lines both in North Charleston and in Everett. Boeing needed all the production it could get.
Solomon knew that issuing the complaint would be controversial. He had already been warned by Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina that if a complaint was filed, Graham
67
was going after the NLRB “full guns a-blazing.” Solomon did
68
not, however, anticipate the furor which followed.

do so. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Drops Case Against Boeing After Union Reaches Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/
12/10/business/labor-board-drops-case-against-boeing.html.
62. MODJESKA & MODJESKA, supra note 60, at 57.
63. Id. at 60–62.
64. Id. at 92.
65. See Unfair Labor Practice Process Chart, NLRB, http://www.nlrb
.gov/resources/nlrb-process/unfair-labor-practice-process-chart (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014).
66. Facilitate Settlements, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/
facilitate-settlements (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
67. Kevin Bogardus, Senator Threatened Labor Board Before Boeing
Complaint, THE HILL, Nov. 9, 2011, http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/
192737-sen-graham-threatened-labor-board-before-boeing-complaint-was-filed.
When questioned by The Hill, Graham explained but did not disavow the
comments. Id. “I meant that I would vigorously criticize the NLRB and actively work to protect the economic interests of South Carolina,” he said in a
statement. Id. “Those statements were made to convey to Mr. Solomon the political uproar that would occur both in South Carolina and nationally if the
complaint was filed.” Id.
68. Conversation with Lafe Solomon, Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations
Bd. (Winter, 2013).
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III. THE BOARD UNDER ATTACK
69

The first attacks were aimed at the complaint. Shortly after it was issued, former NLRB Chairman Peter Schaumber
70
described Solomon’s action as “unprecedented,” a claim that
71
was regularly repeated by critics. He added that “if the claim
is upheld, it could jeopardize any company with unionized
72
workers that wants to expand to a right-to-work state.” He did
not explain why this was so.
On May 12, 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform wrote to Solomon advising him that the
73
committee was investigating his decision to issue a complaint.
Solomon was ordered to provide the Committee with “all documents and communications referring or relating to the . . . in74
vestigation of Boeing.”
69. See, e.g., Stephanie Armour & Susanna Ray, Republicans Rally Behind Boeing Over Labor Board Complaint, BLOOMBERG, May 5, 2011, http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-05/republicans-rally-behind-boeing-over-u
-s-labor-board-complaint.html; Allen Smith, NLRB’s Boeing Complaint Targeted, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (May 27, 2011), http://www.shrm.org/
legalissues/federalresources/pages/boeingcomplaint.aspx.
70. Judson Berger, Ex-Labor Board Chairman: Union-Backed Case
Against Boeing ‘Unprecedented’, FOXNEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2011/04/26/ex-labor-board-chairman-union-backed-case
-boeing-unprecedented/#i. Presidential candidate Mitt Romney made
Schaumber one of his labor advisors later that year. Josh Eidelson, New Trouble for Ex-Romney Aide, SALON, May 3, 2012, http://www.salon.com/2012/05/
03/new_trouble_for_ex_romney_aide/.
71. See Adam Shah, Experts Say Allegations in NLRB Complaint Against
Boeing Represent “Classic” Case of Labor Law Violations, MEDIA MATTERS FOR
AMERICA (May 14, 2011, 12:11 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2011/05/
14/experts-say-allegations-in-nlrb-complaint-again/179638 (listing examples
from media where complaint was critiqued as “unprecedented”).
72. Berger, supra note 70.
73. Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t
Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., Census &
the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce,
U.S. Postal Serv. and Labor Pol’y, to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel,
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (May 12, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/2011-05-12_dei_gowdy_
_ross_to_solomon-nlrb_-_ogc_boeing_iam_due_5-27.pdf.
74. Id. While Solomon agreed to testify at a Committee hearing, he contested the scope of the information requested. Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Acting General Counsel Lafe Solomon Testifies at Oversight Committee Field Hearing in South Carolina (June 17, 2011), available at http://
www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/acting-general-counsel-lafe-solomon
-testifies-oversight-committee-field. In a letter from Celeste Mattina, Acting
Deputy General Counsel, Mattina took the position that “Your letter broadly
seeks confidential and privileged information, internal deliberative materials,
attorney work product and settlement communications . . . .” Letter from Ce-
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On May 13, 2011, eleven Republican members of the House
of Representatives sent Solomon a letter in which they accused
him of “sacrificing South Carolina jobs to further an activist
75
agenda.” The attacks soon were extended beyond the General
Counsel to the agency generally. On May 14, George Will argued, “The NLRB has read a 76-year-old statute (the 1935
Wagner Act) perversely . . . . [in a] reckless attempt to break a
great corporation, and by extension all businesses, to govern76
ment’s saddle . . . .”
An article published by the Heritage Foundation claimed
that that the “National Labor Relations Board is twisting the
law to benefit unions at the expense of the rule of law and the
77
nation’s economy.” It attributed the complaint to the Board’s
hostility to South Carolina because it is a “right to work
78
state.” The Wall Street Journal similarly claimed that “[t]he
NLRB’s campaign against Boeing . . . is a government attempt
to restrict the free movement of capital. It attempts to punish
workers merely because their states passed right-to-work
79
laws.”

leste J. Mattina, Acting Deputy Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., to
Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., Census & the Nat’l Archives, &
Dennis Ross, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv. and
Labor Pol’y (May 27, 2011), available at https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/
files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/may_27.pdf. Mattina’s position was
strongly supported by Senator Harkin, Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. In a letter to Solomon and to Chair
Wilma Liebman, Senator Harkin wrote, “Turning over the requested documents could violate the due process rights of parties in this case . . . . The
Board must exercise caution to preserve the integrity of its administrative
processes from inappropriate political interference.” Letter from Tom Harkin,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, to Wilma Liebman,
Chair, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. & Lafe Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l
Labor Relations Bd. (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/
default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3348/harken8-11-11.pdf.
75. Letter from Joe Wilson, Rep., et al., to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen.
Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. (May 13, 2011), available at http://online
.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/NLRBLetter.pdf.
76. George Will, The NLRB vs. Boeing: Obama Administration Puts Politics Before the Economy, SEATTLE TIMES, May 14, 2011, http://seattletimes
.com/html/opinion/2015045500_will15.html.
77. HANS A. VON SPAKOVSKY & JAMES SHERK, THE HERITAGE FOUND.,
LEGAL MEMORANDUM NO. 66 ON LABOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
OVERREACH AGAINST BOEING IMPERILS JOBS AND INVESTMENT (2011).
78. Id.
79. Op-Ed., The White House vs. Boeing, WALL ST. J., July 28, 2011, at
A16.
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The governor of South Carolina, Nikki Haley, regularly repeated the charge and, going beyond those who called for
amendment of the NLRA, challenged the very existence of the
Board, saying, “Anything that would disband the NRLB, I’d be
80
the biggest cheerleader for.” And former South Carolina Governor Mark Sanford, appearing on “FOX & Friends,” somehow
attributed the complaint to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi: “You
got Pelosi now, somebody from the opposite coast of America,
saying, you know, if they don’t unionize, they need to shut the
plant down. That goes against 200 years of tradition in Ameri81
ca . . . .” Yet another claim based on tradition was made by
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney who, in a widely published press
release, accused the NLRB of “a fundamental assault on the
capitalist principles that have sustained America’s competitiveness since it became the world’s largest economy nearly 140
82
years ago.” On June 14, Newt Gingrich suggested that one of
the things the Congress should do immediately is “defund the
NLRB, which has gone into South Carolina to punish Boe83
ing . . . .”
On June 17, Solomon testified under subpoena before the
House Oversight Committee about the decision to issue a com84
plaint. The hearing was held in North Charleston, and Gover85
nor Haley addressed the Committee in the afternoon. She refused to be present during the morning while Solomon was
present. In his opening comments, Committee Chair Darrell
Issa implied that “Mr. Solomon’s decision to issue a complaint
was tailored to reward the President’s powerful financial and

80. Tanya Somanader, South Carolina Gov. Haley Insists on Disbanding
the “Un-American” National Labor Relations Board, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 2,
2011), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2011/09/02/311362/south-carolina-gov
-haley-insists-on-disbanding-the-un-american-national-labor-relations-board/.
81. FOX & Friends: Mark Sanford Talks President’s Jobs Bill (FOX News
television broadcast Nov. 7, 2011), available at http://video.foxnews.com/v/
1262155496001/mark-sanford-talks-presidents-jobs-bill/#sp=show-clips.
82. Jim McNerney, Op-Ed., Boeing Is Pro-Growth, Not Anti-Union, WALL
ST. J., May 11, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870
3730804576315141682547796.
83. Hearing Begins in Labor Complaint Against Boeing, KING 5 NEWS,
June 14, 2011, http://www.king5.com/news/Hearing-to-begin-in-labor
-complaint-against-Boeing-123814774.html.
84. Unionization Through Regulation: The NLRB’s Holding Pattern on
Free Enterprise: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform,
112th Cong. 3 (2011). I was present as an expert witness for the Democrats on
the Committee.
85. Id. at 136.
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He spared few adjectives

And finally, Mr. Solomon’s decision—which has been described as
“loony,” “militant,” “retaliatory,” “unmerited,” “unprecedented,” and
“the most politicized” decision in NRLB’s history—will doubtlessly
cause collateral damage on the free movement of business and capital
87
in the United States.

Chairman Issa’s comments set the tone for the Republican
members of the Committee, who continued the attack on Solo88
mon. Congressman Gowdy charged that “the NLRB has essentially become a sycophant for labor unions. . . . [T]he NLRB
seeks to give unions a historically unprecedented level of influ89
ence.” South Carolina Congressman Tim Scott suggested the
complaint was an effort to “use union workers and their dues as
a way to create a winning combination for a Presidential cam90
paign.”
In the aftermath of the hearing, leading candidates for the
91
Republican presidential nomination joined in the criticism. As
they did so, the Republican charge against the NLRB expanded
to include the assertion that the NLRB was seeking to prevent
Boeing from opening a plant in South Carolina. Texas Governor
Rick Perry was one of the first to sound the theme: “You see,
President Barack Obama stacked the National Labor Relations
Board with anti-business cronies who want to dictate to a pri-

86. Id. at 3.
87. Id. at 5.
88. See generally id. Several of the Republicans argued that there could
not be discrimination against the workers in Everett because none of them
had lost work as a result of Boeing’s decision. Id.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 19. The Democrats on the Committee denied that the Board had
done anything radical. Congresswoman Maloney denied that Boeing was being
charged because it moved work to a right-to-work state. Congresswoman Norton argued that a hearing before the statutory process had been completed
was improper interference with an independent agency. She pointed out that
House and Senate members were “threatening subpoenas, demanding the
privileged work product of counsel, and threatening to defund . . . the National
Labor Relations Board, before it has made a decision or even heard the case.”
Id. at 15.
91. See Amy Bingham, Obama Breaks Silence About Boeing v. NLRB Labor Dispute, ABC NEWS (June 29, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/
2011/06/obama-breaks-silence-about-boeing-v-nlrb-labor-dispute/ (“Nearly every Republican presidential candidate has spoken out against the [Boeing]
case.”).
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vate company, Boeing, where they can build a plant.” This
93
theme was quickly sounded by a variety of commentators.
In a widely shown television ad, Governor Mitt Romney
stated during the South Carolina primary, “The National Labor
Relations Board, now stacked with union stooges selected by
the President, says to a free enterprise like Boeing, ‘You can’t
build a factory in South Carolina because South Carolina is a
right-to-work state.’ That is simply un-American. . . .It’s politi94
cal payback of the worst kind.”
While the dispute raged, a series of bills to limit the
95
Board’s authority was filed in the House of Representatives.
One of the most draconian was H.R. 2587, introduced in July
2011 by South Carolina Congressman Tim Scott, entitled the
96
“Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act.” Its
avowed purpose was to rescind the NLRB’s right to remedy un-

92. Michael A. Fletcher, Labor Board Flies into Political Scene, J. GASept. 4, 2011, http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20110904/BIZ/
309049970/-1/BIZ09.
93. Romney made a claim similar to Perry’s at a Republican debate.
Bloomberg News/Washington Post Republican Debate at Dartmouth College,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/politics/
bloomberg-washington-post-republican-presidential-debate.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
94. Mitt Romney, Free Enterprise, YOUTUBE (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=qytehw0vU9I. In an op-ed, Gary Shapiro, president and
CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association, expanded on the point:
Earlier this year the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) took the
unprecedented action of telling a company that it cannot open a new
factory in South Carolina. Never mind that Boeing had spent more
than one billion dollars on a plant that was going to create 1,000 new
jobs. The NLRB rubber-stamped the Washington state union complaint that Boeing was somehow doing something illegal by adding a
production facility in South Carolina rather than in Washington. So
Airbus cheers as our own federal government stops an American
company from hiring American workers and producing goods in the
U.S.
Gary Shapiro, How the Obama Administration Is Hurting Job Creation,
FORBES, Aug. 17, 2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/garyshapiro/2011/08/17/
how-the-obama-administration-is-hurting-job-creation/.
95. See Job Protection Act, H.R. 1976, 112th Cong. (2011), available at
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1976; Tim Devaney, House Panel
OK’s Bill to Limit NLRB, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www
.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/oct/26/house-panel-oks-bill-to-limit-nlrb/?
page=all (reporting on passage of H.R. 3094, “The Workforce Democracy and
Fairness Act” in committee).
96. Protecting Jobs from Government Interference Act, H.R. 2587, 112th
Cong. (2011), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr2587.
ZETTE,
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fair labor practices by requiring employers to undo unlawful ac97
tions. Its terms were sweeping:
[T]he Board shall have no power to order an employer (or seek an order against an employer) to restore or reinstate any work, product,
production line, or equipment, to rescind any relocation, transfer,
subcontracting, outsourcing, or other change regarding the location,
entity, or employer who shall be engaged in production or other business operations, or to require any employer to make an initial or addi98
tional investment at a particular plant, facility, or location.

If passed into law, this bill would have rendered the NLRB
ineffective in many areas. For example, under current law, employers in unionized facilities are required to bargain to impasse before making unilateral changes in wages, hours, or
99
conditions of employment. If an employer is found to have violated his duty by unilateral action, the Board typically orders it
100
to restore the status quo. H.R. 2587 would have eliminated
the standard remedy and left employers free to make basic unilateral changes—eliminate lines of work, hire subcontractors,
and switch jobs to non-union facilities—secure in the
101
knowledge that the Board could not remedy its actions. The
amendment thus would have run directly counter to the stated
policy of the Act, “encouraging the practice and procedure of
102
collective bargaining.” Congressman Scott was appointed to
the Senate by Governor Haley when Senator Jim DeMint re103
signed. His role in defending Boeing and attacking the NLRB
104
was widely noted in reports of his appointment.
The majority report on H.R. 2587 stated that “[t]o ensure
employees can continue to exercise their rights under federal
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See MODJESKA & MODJESKA, supra note 60, § 9:9 (explaining the basic
principles of impasse).
100. See id. § 2:4 (discussing the NLRB’s remedial authority).
101. H.R. 2587.
102. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). H.R. 2587 would
similarly give tacit permission to employers to do away with a segment of their
enterprise that chooses to unionize, and it provides employers with another
reason for telling employees that choosing to unionize is risky. H.R. 2587, § 2.
It would also undercut the right to strike by making it far easier for employers
to punish striking units by eliminating or transferring out their work. Id.
103. Aaron Blake & Chris Cillizza, Nikki Haley Appoints Rep. Tim Scott to
Senate, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the
-fix/wp/2012/12/17/nikki-haley-to-appoint-rep-tim-scott-to-senate.
104. See Earl Capps, Tim Scott: A Warrior for Worker Rights in the Senate,
FRONTPAGE MAG, Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.frontpagemag.com/2012/earl
-capps/tim-scott-a-warrior-for-worker-rights-in-the-senate.
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labor law, the NLRB will continue to have more than a dozen
strong remedies against unfair labor practices to protect work105
ers and hold unlawful employers accountable.” The report
failed to list any of the strong remedies, and none come to
106
mind. In fact, the Board’s remedial power under existing law
is already severely restrained. The Board cannot impose sanc107
108
tions. It may not seek to punish wrongdoers. It cannot im109
pose fines. It cannot require anything that would amount to a
110
new contract between the parties.
While the Board was under attack, the majority of Demo111
crats, including President Obama, were silent.
When the
President finally addressed the issue, his comments were notable for their attempt to create an impression of Presidential
neutrality while simultaneously expressing sympathy towards
Boeing’s entrepreneurial needs. According to ABC News:
The President today put distance between his administration and the
labor board stressing that it is “an independent agency.”
“We can’t afford to have labor and management fighting all the
time . . . .”

....
“As a general proposition, companies need to have the freedom to
relocate—they have to follow the law, but that’s part of our system,”
Obama said. “What I think defies common sense would be a notion
that we would be shutting down a plant or laying off workers because
112
labor and management can’t come to a sensible agreement.”

Nowhere in the President’s statement is there a hint of
support for the Board’s actions. Indeed, President Obama’s
statement, while lacking political vitriol, is consistent with Republican complaints about “shutting down a plant” and “laying
113
off workers.” The President not only took care to separate
105. JOHN KLINE, PROTECTING JOBS FROM GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE
ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 112-179, at 3 (2011).
106. But see id. at 5 (describing back-pay orders and bargaining orders as
remedies that the NLRB would retain).
107. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. I was asked by lawyers at AFL-CIO to draft a sign-on letter opposing
Congressman Scott’s bill, for submission to Congress, pointing out the bill’s
deficiencies. I did so and my letter in final form was quickly signed by over 200
academics. However, I was advised by savvy lawyers at AFL-CIO to edit my
first draft because I focused too much on the Boeing case. “Many Democrats in
Congress are uncomfortable with the issue,” I was told.
112. Bingham, supra note 91.
113. Id. The case against Boeing was made most strongly in pro-union
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himself from the General Counsel’s actions but also, while the
debate raged, went out of his way to show support for Boeing.
As the Washington Times reported during a subsequent trip to
Asia by the President: “A good deal of Mr. Obama’s trip has
seemed like an effort to mend fences with the aerospace giant. Mr. McNerney [Boeing’s CEO] served as moderator for Mr.
Obama’s question-and-answer session with business executives
at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Hawaii
114
last weekend.” The ties between the Obama administration
and Boeing were close before the controversy and remain
strong. William Daley, then Obama’s chief of staff, was on Boeing’s board of directors when the company decided to open the
115
second line in South Carolina. Boeing’s CEO, Jim McNerney,
was Chair of the President’s Export Council, and the President
appointed John Bryson, the longest-serving director on Boeing’s
116
board, to be Secretary of Commerce.
IV. THE SETTLEMENT
While the political attacks on the Board continued, Boeing
117
and the IAM entered into secret negotiations. The union’s
blogs. For example, on August 16, a post on Talking Union by Stan Sorscher
argued that Boeing management was part of a campaign to destroy worker
rights:
As the stakes continue to rise, it’s becoming clear that Boeing has no
intention of settling the case, or ever complying with the law. They’ve
said they expect to lose their case before the NLRB. Their goal is to
re-write the law. They will use this case to assert a new right for employers to intimidate workers who strike. This would shift power
away from workers on a scale similar to Ronald Reagan using scabs to
break the Air Traffic Controllers’ strike in 1981.
Stan Sorscher, Code of the Pirates: Boeing and the NLRB, TALKING UNION
(Aug. 16, 2011), http://talkingunion.wordpress.com/2011/08/16/pirate-code.
114. Dave Boyer, Obama Backs Boeing in $21.7B Deal, WASH. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/17/obama-backs
-boeing-in-217b-deal.
115. See Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Director William M. Daley Resigns
Board Seat (Jan. 10, 2011), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=20295&
item=1578 (reporting that Daley was a board member since 2006); see also
Letter from Lindsey O. Graham, Senator, U.S. Senate, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (June 17, 2011), in Unionization
Through Regulation: The NLRB’s Holding Pattern on Free Enterprise: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 112th Cong. 9, 10 (2011)
[hereinafter June 17 Graham Letter], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/CHRG-112hhrg71079/pdf/CHRG-112hhrg71079.pdf.
116. These connections are set forth in a letter of June 17, 2011 from Senator Lindsey Graham to Darrell Issa. June 17 Graham Letter, supra note 115.
117. Dominic Gates, Boeing, Machinists Reach Sweeping Agreement,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, http://seattletimes.com/html/business
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chief negotiator was Vice President Rich Michalski. Chief negotiator for Boeing was Raymond Conner, President of Boeing’s
119
commercial division. Michalski quickly concluded that Boeing
120
wanted to restore good relations with the union. To the surprise of commentators, on November 30, 2011, the parties
reached agreement on a new collective bargaining contract that
increased wages and benefits for Boeing’s unionized workers
121
and assured them of continued employment. In return, the
122
union promised not to strike until 2016. In the aftermath of
the agreement, and at the urging of the Board’s General Coun123
sel, the ALJ dismissed the complaint against Boeing. Boeing
124
and the union publicly exchanged compliments.
The agreement established a “Joint Union/Boeing Council,”
which meets “on a monthly basis, to review and discuss key el125
ements of the business and workforce.” It also included a side
letter which announced that “the Company will produce the
737NG models and 737MAX models in Renton” and that “[t]he
fabrication work currently being performed by bargaining unit
employees in support of the 737 production will be contin126
ued . . . in Puget Sound and Portland.” The side letter also
technology/2016895323_boeingmax01.html.
118. Press Release, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Machinists to Vote on Deal to Land Boeing’s 737 MAX (Nov. 30, 2011), available
at http://www.goiam.org/Ikea/index.php/news/press-releases/9543-machinists
-to-vote-on-deal-to-land-boeings-737-max.
119. Jon Ostrower, 737 Max to Be Assembled in Renton on Contract Approval, FLIGHTGLOBAL (Dec. 8, 2011, 6:11 PM), http://www.flightglobal.com/
news/articles/737-max-to-be-assembled-in-renton-on-contract-approval
-365734.
120. Press Release, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, supra
note 118.
121. William Rogers, IAM and Boeing Reach Surprise Tentative Agreement,
LEFT LAB. REP. (Dec. 2, 2011), http://leftlaborreporter.wordpress.com/2011/
12/02/iam-and-boeing-reach-surprise-tentative-agreement; see also COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOEING COMPANY AND INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MACHINISTS AND AEROSPACE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
AND CERTAIN DISTRICTS AND LOCAL LODGES THEREOF (2011) [hereinafter
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT], available at http://www.iam751
.org/pages/xzIAM-BOEING%20CBA%20with%20LOUs.pdf.
122. Id. at 75.
123. Jennifer Booton, Case Closed: Union Drops NLRB Complaint Against
Boeing, FOX BUS. (Dec. 9, 2011), available at http://www.foxbusiness.com/
industries/2011/12/09/case-closed-union-drops-nlrb-complaints-against
-boeing/.
124. See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 118.
125. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 121, at 176.
126. Id. at 178.
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stated that “[t]he Company intends to continue production of
127
wide-body airplanes in its Everett facilities.”
Once the
agreement was approved by the union’s members, Boeing
128
opened the anticipated “temporary” surge line in Everett. Assembly of the 787 was thereafter done in three production lines:
129
two in Washington and one in South Carolina. The agreement quickly improved Boeing’s relationship with the machin130
ists union, as it was intended to do. In effect, the three-line
option, which Solomon recognized as the likely way to settle the
131
case, had been adopted.
The settlement slowed, but did not stop, attacks on the
Board. In the immediate aftermath of the settlement, leading
Republicans, including the main candidates for the party’s
presidential nomination, ignored the agreement and continued
132
to attack the NLRB. Prior to the South Carolina primary
election, Rick Santorum stated that “[i]n South Carolina, the
National Labor Relations Board intervened directly in Boeing’s
business decisions. . . . [T]he threat to ’all Americans’ economic
133
freedom continues.”
Mitt Romney made the issue an important part of his campaign, regularly calling the members of
134
the Board “labor stooges.” Senator Graham announced that
135
his campaign against the NLRB would continue.
127. Id.
128. John Gillie, Boeing Opening Third 787 Dreamliner Assembly Line,
THE NEWS TRIB., Aug. 28, 2012, http://blog.thenewstribune.com/business/2012/
08/28/boeing-opening-third-787-dreamliner-assembly-line.
129. Id.
130. Booton, supra note 123.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Holly Rosenkrantz & Stephanie Armour, U.S. House Passes
Limit Labor Board Powers After Boeing Case, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-15/u-s-house
-passes-limit-labor-board-powers-after-boeing-case.html; Rick Santorum, The
Sunshine State Needs Jobs Not Big Government, RED STATE (Jan. 29, 2012,
2:12 PM), http://www.redstate.com/rjsantorum/2012/01/29/the-sunshine-state
-needs-jobs-not-big-government.
133. Santorum, supra note 132.
134. Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132.
135. Lindsey Graham, On President Obama’s Recess Appointments to the
NLRB, ABOUT SENATOR GRAHAM BLOG (Jan. 4, 2012), http://www.lgraham
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutSenatorGraham.Blog&Content
Record_id=aac4307c-802a-23ad-43b7-58870c8590ff (“The NLRB has become
an out-of-control rogue bureaucracy. President Obama, by empowering this
agency rather than reforming it, is making job creation even more difficult. I
will continue to do everything in my power to put the brakes on the NLRB as
currently constructed. I again encourage the appropriate House and Senate
committees to investigate the contacts between the NLRB and Machinists Un-
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136

Representative Scott announced, “this outcome does not
whitewash the fact that the NLRB has become a biased, politi137
cally-driven organization.”
Representative Issa stated that
the settlement would not deter the committee because of “seri138
ous questions that remain[ed] unanswered.” Attacks on the
Board and its members persisted as a consistent theme of
House Republicans and their supporters.
In February 2013, the Wall Street Journal published an
opinion piece that applauded continuing congressional attacks
on the NLRB and traced the conflict back to “the [B]oard’s out139
rageous action in [the Boeing] dispute.” On January 31, 2013,
Senators Scott and Blunt introduced a bill to shut down the
Board pending a decision on the legality of interim Board ap140
pointments by President Obama. In his press release on the
bill, Senator Scott specifically traced his opposition to the
141
Board back to the Boeing dispute.
The political nature of the attacks is underlined by their
lack of connection to the factual circumstances of the Boeing
complaint. Governor Romney’s statements epitomize the inac142
curacy of the attacks. As a graduate of Harvard Law School,
whose labor advisory committee included a former chairman of
the NLRB, Romney should have known that the NLRB had
taken no action and that a variety of hearings and reviews had
ion in their complaint against The Boeing Company.”).
136. Scott has since been appointed to the Senate by Governor Haley to replace Senator Demint, who retired. Blake & Cillizza, supra note 103.
137. Raymond J. Keating, Need to Rein in NLRB as Political Hot Spot, THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL VIEW (Dec. 8, 2011), http://65.36.146.95/news/display.cfm?
ID=4705.
138. Keith Laing, Issa: NLRB Withdrawal a ‘Victory,’ but Investigation Will
Continue, THE HILL (Dec. 9, 2011, 6:49 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
transportation-report/labor-employment/198429-issa-nlrb-withdrawal-a
-victory-but-investigation-will-continue-.
139. Bernie Marcus, The National Labor Relations Board Goes Rogue,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127
887324162304578302590637139214.
140. Press Release, Senator Tim Scott, Senator Scott Joins Colleagues in
Effort to Rein in NLRB, Reaffirm the Constitution (Jan. 31, 2013) (“Scott has
been a leader in Congressional efforts to rein in the NLRB following the
Board’s attempt to destroy jobs in South Carolina in 2011–12.”), available at
http://www.scott.senate.gov/press-release/senator-scott-joins-colleagues-effort
-rein-nlrb-reaffirm-constitution.
141. Id.
142. Ari Shapiro, At Harvard, Romney Wasn’t Your Typical Student, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (May 21, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/21/1531979
70/at-harvard-romney-wasnt-your-typical-student.
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143

to occur before one could speak of any action by the NLRB.
Neither the NLRB and its Board nor the General Counsel ever
sought to prevent Boeing from opening a factory in South Carolina. In fact, as previously pointed out, Boeing already had a
144
factory in South Carolina.
Furthermore, the complaint
acknowledged that Boeing could transfer work to South Caroli145
na.
Governor Romney stated that the NLRB’s actions were “po146
litical payback,” but there is no evidence to support this allegation, which the Board’s Acting General Counsel Lafe Solo147
mon has vigorously denied. Solomon, a career labor lawyer
with no known political involvement and a reputation for honorable behavior, has served as legal advisor to both conservative and liberal Board members. It is not as though the decision
to issue a complaint was a departure from established NLRB
148
law.
Finally, no statement by the General Counsel or any employee of the Board suggests that South Carolina’s status as a
right-to-work state played any part in the decision to issue a
149
complaint.
The matter was not referred to in the Advice
143. This point was stressed in the Oversight Committee hearings by the
expert witness for the Republicans, Philip Miscimarra, a distinguished management lawyer. See Capital Investment, Relocations and Major Business
Changes Under the NLRA: Hearing Before the Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://www.morganlewis
.com/pubs/MiscimarraStatement-CapInvstNLRA_17june11.pdf (“The General
Counsel does not decide these cases. . . . [T]he General Counsel identifies the
cases that warrant being litigated for resolution by the NLRB.”); see also Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Philip
Miscimarra) (“The Board’s general counsel acts like a traffic cop. He can issue
a citation, but he doesn’t write the laws, and he doesn’t decide the cases.”).
144. See supra Part I.
145. Complaint, supra note 1.
146. Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132.
147. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Lafe
Solomon, acting general counsel, National Labor Relations Board).
148. Christy Concannon, The EAJA and the NLRB: Chilling the General
Counsel’s Prerogative to Issue Unfair Labor Practice Complaints?, 36 CATH. U.
L. REV. 175, 186 (1986) (“In NLRB proceedings, the issuance of a complaint is
the starting point for any litigation.”).
149. It is not clear whom Romney had in mind when he used the phrase
“labor stooges,” or whether, indeed, he can differentiate among the Board
members. See, e.g., Robert Behre, Mitt Romney, in South Carolina, Takes Aim
at NLRB, POLITICO, Sept. 12, 2011, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0911/63252.html#ixzz2uTCmA3WO. None of them can with any justification
be deemed a “labor stooge.” At the time, the right wing’s most frequently targeted Board member was Craig Becker, who was the subject of an editorial in
The American Spectator. W. James Antle III, Craig Becker and Boeing, THE
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Memo that provided the legal basis for issuance of a com150
plaint.
Most misleadingly, Romney’s statement was aired
throughout the South Carolina campaign with no acknowledgement of the fact that the case had already been settled to
Boeing’s clearly expressed satisfaction.
V. THE LEGALITY OF THE COMPLAINT
In attacking the General Counsel’s decision to issue a complaint in the Boeing case, none of the Board’s critics seriously
addressed the crucial question of whether Boeing actually violated the law by its actions. In fact, the case against Boeing in
view of the language and basic policy of the NLRA is very
strong.
Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer “by discrimination in regard to . . . any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
151
membership in any labor organization.” Did Boeing’s action
in opening a new assembly line in South Carolina for the express purpose of avoiding the union constitute “discrimination
under the NLRA”? The answer according to established precedent is yes. Boeing treated the union members differently than
it would have treated them had they not engaged in activity
protected by the NLRA. As I pointed out many years ago, the
term “discrimination” does not require an employer to treat union members and non-union members differently; as long as it
treats them differently than it would have had they not en152
gaged in activity protected by the NLRA. In this case, the
term is particularly applicable because Boeing explicitly and
publically distinguished between workers represented by a union and those not represented.
AM. SPECTATOR, Oct. 3, 2011, http://spectator.org/articles/36851/craig-becker
-and-boeing (“The Boeing case is arguably the biggest labor controversy of the
Obama administration, and Becker is seen as emblematic of this White
House’s tilt in favor of unions against businesses in a challenging economic
environment.”). Becker is among the last people whom experts familiar with
his work would refer to as a stooge. He is, among other things, a summa cum
laude graduate of Yale and honors graduate of Yale Law School. Craig Becker,
WASH. POST POLITICS, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/craig-becker/
gIQAmMDaAP_topic.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). Earlier in his career,
Becker was a well-respected legal scholar who taught at UCLA and the University of Chicago. Id.
150. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14.
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
152. Julius G. Getman, Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 735, 752–55 (1965).
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Did Boeing’s action “discourage membership” as that term
is used in the NLRA? Once again, the answer is clearly yes,
since the Supreme Court has long held that to “encourage or
discourage membership” in a union means also to encourage or
153
discourage participation in union activities.
Boeing’s actions were also directly contrary to the basic
purpose of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, which the Supreme Court
stated as “to allow employees to freely exercise their right to
join unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain
154
from joining any union without imperiling their livelihood.” It
seems clear that Boeing violated both the spirit and the letter
of the section by avowedly punishing its Everett employees for
engaging in the basic union activity of striking. The clear line
of authority supporting the issuance of a complaint was pointed
out in the Advice Memo, which urged the Acting General Coun155
sel to issue a complaint. Similarly, there is little doubt under
NLRB precedent, as set forth in the Advice Memo, that Boeing’s statements, which explain its decision in terms of avoiding
strikes, constituted a threat of retaliation under Board law in
156
violation of § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. As several noted labor law
professors have observed, the decision to issue a complaint was
157
a correct one under existing Board case law. At a minimum,
Solomon had a “presentable case.” Furthermore, as he has noted, part of his function is to “present important legal issues to
158
the Board for resolution.”

153. Radio Officers’ Union of the Commercial Tels., Union, A.F.L. v.
N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 39–40 (1954).
154. Id. at 40.
155. See NLRB Advice Memo, supra note 14, at 17–23.
156. See id. at 14–17.
157. Adam Shah, Experts Say Allegations in NLRB Complaint Against Boeing Represent “Classic” Case of Labor Law Violations, MEDIA MATTERS FOR
AMERICA (May 14, 2011, 12:11 AM), http://mediamatters.org/research/2011/05/
14/experts-say-allegations-in-nlrb-complaint-again/179638. I served as expert
witness for the Democrats on the Committee. I sought to respond to the outrage of the critics by pointing out that labor law experts characterized the
General Counsel’s actions as being well within established NLRA jurisprudence. See Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Julius Getman) (“The political commentators saw in this case something unparalleled, dangerous, very powerful, threatening essentially the capitalist system
and the ability of employers to transfer work from one facility to another. . . .
The law professors saw this as a fairly routine Section 8(a)(3) charge. . . . This
is not in any way an earth-shaking case.”).
158. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Lafe
Solomon, acting general counsel, NLRB).
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Although the Acting General Counsel properly followed
NLRB precedent, as he was bound to do, it is less clear that the
Board’s violation would have been upheld by courts of appeals,
which through the long history of the NLRA have been less
supportive than the Board of the policy of insulating employee
union activity from economic retaliation. In several important
cases, courts of appeals have stated that it is legitimate for employers to take actions that harm workers based on efforts to
159
forestall lawful but economically costly union activity. For
example, in N.L.R.B. v. Lassing, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit took the position that the “reasonably anticipated
increased costs, regardless of whether this increased cost
was . . . caused by the advent of the Union or by some other fac160
tor,” justified the transfer of work.
The General Counsel’s case would have been even weaker
in the courts of appeals on the issue of remedy. For example, in
Garwin Corp. v. N.L.R.B., an employer moved its base of manu161
facture from New York to Florida. The Court of Appeals, in
an opinion by Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger, accepted the
Board’s finding that that “there was no genuine economic motivation independent of the hostility toward the union” for the
162
move. Garwin is one of the few cases in which major transfer
of work was held to be a violation of the NLRA. But the Court
limited the remedy, holding that it had to be directed to making
whole the affected employees who lost jobs because of the trans163
fer. In the Boeing case, this would have been a minor cost,
since no employees actually lost their jobs as a result of the
transfer, and computing possible financial loss would have been
almost impossible. Lawyers for the union were aware that they
were unlikely to have obtained a strong remedy if the case pro164
ceeded; they were eager to settle. They believed that the

159. E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1960).
160. Id.; see also N.L.R.B. v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F. 2d 324, 328–29
(6th Cir. 1955). See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and
Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding the National Labor Relations Act, 71
TEX. L. REV. 921 (1993).
161. 374 F.2d 295, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
162. Id. at 299.
163. Id. at 304.
164. Conversation with David Campbell, Attorney, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (Fall, 2011); Conversation with Chris
Corson, Attorney, International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers (Fall, 2011).
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NLRB’s General Counsel shared this view and was similarly
165
motivated.
VI. THE NLRA AND EMPLOYER DISCRETION
Despite the language and policy of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA,
there was never any real doubt about Boeing’s ability to assign
the work as it chose. It could have avoided legal challenge by
simply establishing the current three-line arrangement. Indeed, if Boeing actually wanted to reduce the role of its unionized workers and to transfer the assembly of the 787 to South
Carolina to avoid the IAM, it could have done so without legal
consequences, had its officials not explained the decision to
open its second line in Charleston in terms of responding to
166
past strikes or the need to prevent future strikes. Its contract
with the IAM specifically gave it the right to make such decisions in accordance with its business judgment.
Even the General Counsel’s complaint acknowledged Boeing’s ability to transfer work to South Carolina based on legiti167
mate economic considerations. Any management labor lawyer
worth his or her salt could have phrased an announcement to
attribute Boeing’s actions to the economic advantages of South
Carolina. In fact, Boeing could have transferred work to South
Carolina in the course of business without press release or controversy.
This tactic has been used many times by many employers,
168
without interference from the NLRB. During the 19’50s and
19’60s, most of the garment industry moved from the northeast
169
to the south with almost no interference from the law. Similarly, in the 19’80s and 19’90s, the Board did not interfere to
protect union jobs when employers such as Boeing transferred
170
manufacturing work to other locations and countries.
Although there are many examples of “runaway shops”—
unionized businesses transferring all or part of their operations
165. Id.
166. See supra Part I.
167. See Complaint, supra note 1.
168. See Estlund, supra note 160, at 946.
169. Garment Industry, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLEVELAND HISTORY,
http://ech.case.edu/cgi/article.pl?id=GI (last visited Apr. 4, 2014).
170. See Richard B. Freeman, What Can We Learn from the NLRA to Create Labor Law for the Twenty-First Century?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 327,
330 (2011) (“The unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA have failed to
deter firms from illegal actions to prevent unionization.”).
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to a non-union location—they have rarely, if ever, been explained in terms of the desire to get away from unions or worker rights. Instead, they have been justified, if at all, in terms of
neutral economic advantages associated with the new location.
Boeing could have done the same. Why, then, did Boeing, a
company with top-flight counsel, ignore the traditional techniques for masking efforts to bypass union facilities?
The role of Boeing’s lawyers in shaping Boeing’s actions
has puzzled many observers. Did they try to tone down the
rhetoric used by management tying transfer of work on the 787
to past lawful strikes? If not, was Boeing, as Richard Epstein
171
has suggested, the victim of bad lawyering? Counsel for the
union have wondered whether Boeing’s lawyers were informed
in advance and approved of the issuance of the statements that
172
led to the charges and complaint. In retrospect, it seems highly unlikely that all these statements were made without legal
review. The number of statements made and the period of time
over which they continued suggest that Boeing’s lawyers knew
and approved. But why would they do so? The likely answer is
that Boeing was trying to prompt further concessions from the
two rival states and simultaneously to issue a warning to its
unionized workers that it was prepared to take drastic steps to
avoid future strikes. Its lawyers probably concluded that it
could do so without serious economic consequences.
The problems caused Boeing by the strikes were serious
and costly. It obviously wanted to underline for its workforce in
Everett that no matter how superior they were as workers,
Boeing needed a period without strikes to meet the demand for
the 787. There is little doubt that the message was received;
Boeing’s workers in Everett are now working at top efficiency
173
and have promised not to strike until 2016. In the meantime,
Boeing is hoping to be able to train its workforce in Charleston
to perform comparably.
In warning its Everett workers about the dangers of striking, Boeing’s lawyers ran little risk. They were always in a position to terminate the legal challenge by coming to agreement
171. On Point: Boeing and the National Labor Relations Board, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Aug. 18, 2011), http://onpoint.wbur.org/2011/08/18/nlrb.
172. David Campbell, supra note 164; Chris Corson, supra note 164.
173. See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, supra note 121, at 75. Four
strikes had been called between 1995 and 2011. Henry Knight, Angie Cowan
Hamada & Thomas D. Allison, Boeing v. NLRB, A.B.A. (2011), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/
1110_aball_flash/1110_aball_flash_boeing_nlrb.html.
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with the IAM. And even if the unfair labor practice complaint
was tried, the danger of a disruptive remedy was slight. As Solomon pointed out at the House Oversight Committee hearing,
“Boeing will have every opportunity at the hearing to establish
that it would be unduly burdensome for them to take the se174
cond line back to Washington State.” If Boeing could do so—
and it seems probable that it could—the Board, even if it found
a violation, would do nothing to disturb the Charleston assembly line. If it found that Boeing in fact violated the NLRA, the
Board would most likely have ordered Boeing to increase utilization of its Everett facility for assembly of the 787. This is
what Boeing has chosen to do on its own and is what seemed
from the first to be the likely solution of the issue. And even so
mild a remedy might well have been rejected by a Court of Appeals. A broader Board order would have been most unlikely,
and enforcement of such an order by the courts even more unlikely.
VII. THE CONSTANTLY WEAKENING ROLE OF THE
NLRB
The Board’s critics portrayed it as a powerful and powerseeking agency capable of challenging and overturning major
economic decisions by huge companies—threatening jobs and
175
inhibiting job creators. But to those of us who have studied
the Board over the years, it is an agency with a mighty mandate, but with very little power and few allies. The Board cannot effectively protect the jobs of workers who support unions.
It has no effective remedy when employers flaunt their duty to
bargain in good faith with a union selected by their workers.
The Board does not have the power to significantly strengthen
the almost atrophied right to strike. And because of a series of
court opinions giving employers the right to make captive audi176
ence speeches and denying the union a right of access, its
election processes will continue to favor employers. The free
177
choice that the Act is meant to protect has long been illusory.

174. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84.
175. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132; Santorum, supra
note 132.
176. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Steelworkers of Am., CIO, 357 U.S. 357,
361–63 (1958).
177. Julius Getman, The National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong;
Can We Fix It?, 45 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2003).
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The Supreme Court has led the way in rejecting interpretations of the NLRA that limit traditional employer powers.
This practice began early in the Act’s history and has remained
a constant theme since. For example, the Court announced in
1938, without reference to the NLRA, that an employer could
hire permanent replacement workers to take jobs previously
178
held by strikers.
In the 1950s, the Court, overruling the
Board, held that employers could make captive audience
speeches to their employees during an organizing campaign
179
and were not required to give the union a chance to respond.
This ruling was solidified in 1991, when the Court rejected the
Board’s efforts to apply a balancing test that would on occasion
180
permit union organizers limited access to company property.
The Court has regularly overruled the Board to narrow the def181
inition of employees under the NLRA. It has created categories of employees not referenced in the statute who are not en182
titled to unionize. It has denied the Board’s ability to impose
even non-controversial contract terms when employers refuse,
in bad faith, to come to agreement with a newly selected un183
ion. As a result, the Board is essentially powerless to remedy
184
employer refusals to bargain in good faith.
CONCLUSION
The anti-Board rhetoric of Republican candidates and
right-wing commentators, while largely based on illusion, had a
185
significant effect on public opinion. It gained traction from
the implied metaphor of the heavy hand of government stifling
needed economic activity. The metaphor was implicit in the
remarks of Representative Trey Gowdy: “An unelected execu178. N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345–46 (1938).
179. United Steelworkers of Am., CIO, 357 U.S. at 361–63.
180. Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527 (1991).
181. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S.
267, 289 (1974). But see N.L.R.B. v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S.
706, 711–12 (2001).
182. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686–88 (1980).
183. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952).
184. For a careful scholarly discussion of the Board’s decline, see generally
Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the Aging of
the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569
(2007).
185. Albert Milliron, 64% Say Boeing Should Be Allowed to Operate NonUnion Plant in South Carolina, POLITISITE (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www
.politisite.com/2011/09/15/64-say-boeing-should-be-allowed-to-operate-plant-in
-south-carolina.
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tive branch entity spokesperson is telling a private company
what it can make, where it can make it, and how much of it it
186
can make.”
The weak response by most Democrats, including the
President, is perhaps attributable to the fact that they found no
compelling counter-metaphor to justify the Board’s actions.
Pro-union bloggers had their own image: that of a huge corpo187
ration stamping on the rights of workers. It was an oldfashioned image, out of keeping with the moderate image of today’s leading Democrats, few of whom were willing to risk being condemned for class warfare by being critical of a corporation that was adding jobs in an economically weak state.
Boeing is one of our last manufacturing champions, able to take
on the world in the creation of highly sophisticated products, of
which the Dreamliner is the most recent. To the uneasy yet silent Democrats and moderates, the complaint against Boeing
must have been seen, at best, as reflecting the unfortunate
costs to productivity and efficiency that come with activist government protection of unions.
Given that the NLRB never ruled on the complaint against
Boeing and that the action of the General Counsel was preliminary, was non-binding, and never threatened to limit Boeing’s
plans, it is surprising that the episode became the focus of so
much commentary and hostility. Why was there such a powerful counterattack launched against a legal action that was so
weak and relatively insignificant?
For Republicans and right-wing commentators, the case offered a chance to attack multiple enemies and simultaneously
reinforce the image of corporations as job creators. A prominent
strategy of the attackers was to suggest that the case revealed
an anti-business cabal joining together the NLRB, the admin188
istration, and organized labor. As part of a cabal with important government agencies, organized labor appears powerful
and even threatening to the rights of ordinary workers. The
government, because it is beholden to organized labor, is forced
to oppose job creation, free choice, and the rule of law. These
themes were struck repeatedly in the attacks against the

186. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (testimony of Trey
Gowdy, Representative, South Carolina).
187. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 121.
188. See, e.g., Rosenkrantz & Armour, supra note 132; Santorum, supra
note 132.
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189

Board. They are evident in the opening statement of Congressman Issa during the House Oversight Committee hearing,
who, in the course of a few paragraphs, announced Boeing’s innocence: “Evidence suggests Boeing’s decision to build the new
assembly plant in South Carolina was simply an act of mana190
gerial discretion.” He also stressed the political power of organized labor: “Any appearance that Mr. Solomon’s decision
was tailored to reward the President’s powerful financial and
political supporters—big labor—would be disturbing. The
American people deserve to know if so-called independent regulatory agencies are exceeding their legal authority to pursue a
191
partisan agenda.”
And he implied the culpability of the
Obama administration: “Why would the administration stand
in the way of reindustrialization of the American work
192
force[?]” These comments, together with the anti-Board, antilabor editorials and speeches, served to create an alternate
universe, one in which unions are politically powerful, the
Board a powerful activist agency, and large companies seeking
to create jobs for workers. But the reality revealed by the battle
over Boeing is far different. The weakness of the labor movement was shown by the failure of Democrats, including the
President, to speak out. The Board became a fashionable
punching bag without taking any action as an agency, and Boeing became an object of solicitude and admiration.
The weakness of the NLRB was revealed, but not caused,
by the Boeing dispute. Numerous factors have contributed to
the Board’s decline, including the increasing activism of reviewing courts, and its own unsatisfactory performance, marked by
193
its shifting maze of politically motivated decisions. But it
would be a mistake to simply do away with the Board. An
agency to protect the rights of workers, one that commands the
respect of employers and unions and the support of the courts,
is still needed. It has been a long time since the Board in its
current form played such a role. It is most unlikely that it will
ever be able to create a labor policy based on properly conceived, consistently applied law and generally accepted princi189. See Santorum, supra note 132.
190. Unionization Through Regulation, supra note 84 (statement of Darrell
E. Issa, Chair, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, Representative,
California).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See generally Liebman, supra note 184.
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pals without significant statutory change. It should, however,
be possible to make the Board more expert and less political,
and to make the process of judicial review more rational.
A starting point would be to end the current political focus
of Board appointments. It would be possible to establish a roster of labor relations neutrals, approved by both labor and
management, for possible appointment to the Board. For ex194
ample, the National Academy of Arbitrators includes many
people who have earned through their decisions the respect of
both union and management leaders.
The process of judicial review also needs amending. What
is needed is a single reviewing appeals court, perhaps one composed of labor experts already on the bench; Judges Douglas
Ginsburg and Marsha S. Berzon come to mind. A non-partisan
expert labor Board whose opinions are reviewed by a single expert court could help to create, at this late date, the type of labor law system contemplated so many years ago by those who
first fought to create the NLRA.

194. See NAT’L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS, http://www.naarb.org (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014).

